Eye-Opening Patterns in FMCSA Data

What started as a simple search led to a question I couldn’t answer. How does a motor carrier with only two trucks have over 1,200 roadside inspections, more than 1,000 roadside violations, and nearly 600 out-of-service orders? Something didn’t add up, and it wasn’t just the math. That’s when I started digging. 

It didn’t take long to realize that this was not an isolated case. Chameleon carriers –companies that repeatedly restart under a new LLC and USDOT number–aren’t a new issue. Drivers have been calling this out for years. They exploit gaps in the system to erase their history of safety violations and fraudulent activity. And it is disturbingly easy for them to do. 

We talk a lot about freight fraud in this industry. We build and invest in AI tools, vetting platforms, detection tools, checklists, blacklists–anything that might flag an email address or a low inspection count. We’re trying to catch the bad guys.

Some believe that’s enough, that fraud detection alone can handle the problem. But those tools only catch carriers after they’ve entered. They don’t stop bad actors from getting in... or back in. We’re not asking the bigger question: Why is it so easy for these carriers to enter in the first place? Instead, we’re masking the real issue, reducing the conversation to: “That carrier is bad. Avoid them.” That doesn’t fix anything. 

With all of this technology at our fingertips, why haven’t we stopped the fraudulent and dangerous carriers? 

Because shiny tools cannot fix a busted foundation. And that foundation is the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) database. If you’ve never doom-scrolled through the ‘Entities with a USDOT number’ dataset, I highly recommend it. Until you see what’s in there, none of this will make sense. 

What follows are just a few patterns I’ve found in the USDOT registration database, which raise far more questions than answers. 

Primary Contacts without full ‘legal’ names. 

As of June 2025, approximately 55,000 new USDOTs have been added to the FMCSA database. This value varies slightly depending on the data source I looked at. 

• 141 list the primary contact as “NO NAME GIVEN” or “FNU.”
  • 136 of those are based in California. 
• 77 records have no primary contact listed. 

The use of “NONAME” or “FNU” (First Name Unknown) typically stems from inconsistencies in immigration identification documents, where given names and surnames aren’t clearly distinguished. While this may explain the naming convention, it creates a significant issue when we analyze patterns in the USDOT data. For systems and tools that rely on exact name matching, these generic or placeholder entries make it nearly impossible to identify duplicate or suspicious registrations.

Addresses without standard formatting.

Earlier this week, I attempted to file for a USDOT number. Despite using a valid commercial address, as well as my childhood home address, I couldn’t get past the address verification step. Both were legitimate. Neither accepted. 

Meanwhile, I’ve found hundreds of USDOTs tied to clearly questionable addresses that somehow passed without issue. 

In the same dataset of 141 USDOTs registered with ‘NO NAME GIVEN/FNU,’ there are 12 distinct address clusters. These include multiple registrations tied to the same apartment complexes. Some unit numbers are missing, while others are entered with slight variations.

• One apartment complex has 27 USDOTs registered; some omit the unit number entirely, while others duplicate the same one. 
• Another complex has 23 USDOTs tied to it, again with overlapping or inconsistent unit details.

Another typical pattern in USDOT address entries, and a significant challenge in linking related USDOTs, is the inconsistent formatting of street types. For example, the same street may appear as “St” in one record and “Street” in another, or “Dr” versus “Drive.”

Without standardized formatting, minor differences, like ‘St’ vs. ‘Street,’ are treated as entirely separate addresses. This breaks the ability to spot patterns, flag clusters, or connect related entities. 

It's the perfect loophole for fraud to hide in plain sight.

Self-Reported Driver and Vehicle Information

One of the clearest examples of unreliable self-reported data comes from the carrier with the highest number of roadside inspections during Blitz Week in May 2025. According to their own filing, they operate just two trucks. 

Yet, since the company started on February 18, 2025, they have racked up 1,293 roadside inspections, 1,046 violations, and 594 out-of-service orders. 

No. That’s not a typo.

Multiple public datasets.

The problem is compounded by the fact that FMCSA maintains multiple public datasets. Each is siloed and largely disconnected. There’s no single federal system to track a carrier’s complete history. 

• SAFER: USDOT registration details 
• L&I database: authority and insurance filings
• CSA portal: BASIC scores
• Inspection and crash data on data.transportation.gov

Without third-party tools, it is nearly impossible to detect rebranded or related companies. 

Thankfully, brilliant minds like Garrett Allen are stepping up. His platform, searchcarriers.com, is turning this scattered, fragmented data into something actionable. It’s proof that clarity is possible. 

But as long as the FMCSA registration process allows it, fraudulent carriers will keep exploiting the loopholes and playing a game of racking up violations, inflating safety scores, then wiping the slate clean with a new LLC and USDOT number.

Did you know you can buy USDOT numbers off of Facebook?

New company. New USDOT. Same terrible actors. And yet, we tend to give them far too much credit as “intelligent actors.” They’re not masterminds, they’re just exploiting a system that makes it easy. The data doesn’t just expose their behavior, it maps it. 

We must shift our focus from a reactionary to a proactive approach. We don’t need a total overhaul, but we do need incremental and enforceable changes. By strengthening data entry standards, enforcing robust regulations, leveraging technology responsibly, consolidating data sets, and educating stakeholders, the FMCSA can restore integrity to USDOT registration and protect public safety. Until we confront the tangled, overlapping systems that allow freight fraud to thrive, we’ll continue to chase solutions that merely sound the alarm. 

The house is crumbling, and it’s time to fix the foundation.